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1 Introduction 
This paper describes the origins and development of language planning and policy 
(LPLP) in North Korea. North Korea’s idiosyncratic language policies seem to 
many observers arcane and approaching the fanatical. The country, officially 
known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, is like no other and there 
are factors unique in the North which must be taken into consideration when 
attempting or interpret any policy. This is equally true for policies centered on 
language and its use. In order to truly understand LPLP in North Korea one must 
keep in mind the distinct social and political situations surrounding LPLP—
primarily ideology and propaganda.  
Previous studies on language in North Korea have provided some insight on 
this issue. For example, Kutani (1990) provides an excellent outline for the 
history of LPLP in the North. Song (1994, 2001) addresses the differences in 
LPLP between the North and the South; pointing out that the North’s policies are 
strictly controlled while the South takes a laissez faire approach. Finally, Lee 
(1990) offers a good description of dialectal differences between the two states. 
However, most works either neglect to account for the socio-political setting in 
the North or do not place enough emphasis on political ideology when interpret-
ing language policies, their uses and results. Therefore, the purpose of this paper 
is to address this disparity by highlighting the interrelation between political 
ideology and language policy in North Korea. 
For example, in the North, every decision or policy that affects the masses is 
guided by the theory of Juche, which I will explain in detail in the following 
section. The policies themselves, whether successful or not, are then reinforced 
through excessive propaganda and information control. LPLP has an interesting 
relationship here in that it is directly influenced by Juche, and at the same time 
plays a role in the reinforcement of the ideology through propaganda.  
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In order to illustrate this relationship between political ideology and LPLP, 
section 2 begins by defining Juche. Section 3 is an account of the origins of LPLP 
in North Korea, with a focus on corpus planning. Finally, section 4 highlights the 
interrelationship between the two, as they are both guided by and used to rein-
force one another. 
  
2 Defining Juche 
 
When interpreting any policy from the North, whether it is related to economics, 
politics or laws dictating one’s hairstyle, it is first necessary to address the con-
cept of Juche. The ideology’s origins begin with Kim Il-sung, who ruled the 
country as a stern dictator from 1948 until his death in 1994. It is difficult to 
provide a concise definition for a notion as far-reaching as Juche. The direct 
Korean-English translation for Juche is ‘self-reliance.’ In a simple sense, it is the 
idea a nation can only become successful if it relies solely on internal resources 
for all needs of society. In doing so, a nation rids itself of external influences, 
allowing it to dictate its own path. This is the most basic component of the 
ideology. 
However, there are disturbing underlying themes that accompany this line of 
thought. The first is that all things foreign in a society are inherently flawed 
because they originate from a different culture and people, and the mixing of two 
or more cultures or peoples creates impurity. Additionally, the mere presence of 
foreign influence or commodities in a society suggests that the nation is inferior 
due to its need to rely on outsiders. It should be noted that I use the term “foreign 
influence” loosely. It does not refer to only economic or political influence, but 
also to the presence of anything foreign: products, culture, religion, vocabulary 
and so on.  
According to Juche, allowing signs of foreign influence to arise suggests that 
the nation is not self-reliant, while the absence of foreign presence indicates that a 
nation is strong. These assumptions create a psychological conditioning where 
there is a need for North Korea to keep all things foreign at bay in order protect 
the purity of its culture. This also feeds the notion that a true nation is one that is 
homogeneous, and homogeneity is equivalent to superiority. To illustrate just how 
serious this idea is taken, below is an abbreviation of a article from the the 
North’s Korean Central News Agency (KNCA), which is North Korea’s official 
English newspaper aimed at an international audience. The quote below from an 
article titled “Theory of Multiracial Society” is quite lengthy, but it provides a 
good depiction of North Korea’s stance on the importance of a homogeneous 
society. 
 
A strange farce to hamstring the essential characters of the Korean nation and seek for 
‘multiracial society’ is now being held in South Korea. In this regard Rodong Sinmun 
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today runs a signed commentary, which censures the farce as an unpardonable bid to ne-
gate the homogeneity of the nation, make South Korea multiracial and Americanize it. … 
The South Korean pro-American traitorous forces advocating the theory of ‘multiracial 
society’ are riffraffs who have not an iota of national soul, to say nothing of the elemen-
tary understanding of the view on the nation and social and historic development.  
    If the homogeneity of the nation is not kept, the nation and the destiny of individuals 
cannot be defended. … The theory of ‘multiracial society’ is a poison and anti-
reunification logic aimed to emasculate the basic idea in the era of independent reunifica-
tion. … This is ascribable to the criminal attempt to make the north and the south differ-
ent in lineages, block the June 15 era of reunification and seek the permanent division of 
the nation. (KCNA April 27, 2006) 
 
The passage above includes the three main concepts of Juche—the expulsion 
of foreign influence, homogeneity, and independence through self-reliance. Juche 
is not only applied to reunification politics. Common themes in North Korean 
literature include Juche and art, Juche and filmmaking, Juche and the military, the 
revolution of Juche, agriculture through Juche, Juche as a basis for industry, and 
so on. It should be no surprise that tenants of Juche can also be found in LPLP. 
 
3 LPLP and Linguistic Prescriptions in North Korea 
 
The principles for language planning and policy in North Korea were provided by 
Kim Il-sung in the form of two dialogues. The first dialogue reportedly took place 
on January 3, 1964. In the talk “Some Problems Related to the Development of 
the Korean Language,” Kim poses questions to a group of unnamed ‘linguists’ 
concerning issues facing the Korean language, focusing mainly on vocabulary 
maintenance. These topics were then revisited in a second dialogue on May 16, 
1966 titled: “On Correctly Preserving the National Characteristics of the Korean 
Language.” Each dialogue was later published as “A Talk with the Linguists” in 
an annual volume of all of Kim’s speeches and talks for the respective year, 
which are interpreted as guidelines and prescriptions for a wide array of issues. 
Like many of Kim’s other publications, there is no evidence that he is the author, 
or that discussions with linguists concerning language actually took place. Even 
the date of publication for these talks is under scrutiny (Kutani 1990). Still, 
whether or not these two particular dialogues took place is beside the point. It is 
obvious that language and language use was on Kim’s agenda. The following 
sections describe his mandates for status, corpus and acquisition planning, respec-
tively.  
 
3.1 Status Planning  
 
427
Jacob A. Terrell 
Status Planning is concerned with increasing the number of domains or functions 
in which a language is (officially) used. This in turn increases the language’s 
prestige; the more domains a language occupies, the more attractive it is to 
potential users. Status planning is often an authoritative, top-down affair (though 
it can also be bottom-up), and in many cases it is used to promote a language in a 
domain in which elites are able to maintain or expand their power as native 
speakers (Cooper 1989).  
In the North, Korean was already used in all domains of society at the time of 
these prescriptions. However, the political climate created a need for a new 
standard dialect to replace the notion that the Seoul dialect was still the standard, 
as it was before the Korean War and up to these prescriptions (Kumatani 1990). 
But choosing a Northern dialect as the new standard was not the only problem; in 
Korean the single term pyojuno means ‘standard language.’ Thus, the word 
‘standard language’ alone carried indirect reference to the Seoul dialect. Kim was 
concerned that the ambiguity of using the same term for ‘standard language’ for 
two different dialects may cause confusion and mislead people to believe the 
Seoul dialect is still standard (Kim 1966). In order to avoid this problem Kim 
coined the term munhwao, or ‘cultured language’ to be used it in place of pyojuno 
‘standard language.’ Kim declared the Pyongyang dialect the best representation 
of munhwao ‘cultured language’ since Pyongyang is the center of the revolution 
as the nation’s capital, and thus munhwao ‘cultured language’ will be the lan-
guage of the revolution. This was a very significant move, for it was this decision 
to differentiate Northern speech from that of the South that began an overhaul of 
language in North Korea. This initiated a policy of prescription centered on 
Pyongyang and the revolution of Juche. As the following section shows, this 
policy marked the beginning of establishing linguistic self-reliance and self-
determination.  
 
3.2 Corpus planning  
 
Once the domains of a language have been increased, there is often a need to 
expand the lexicon to fulfill the demands of the new domains. Though corpus 
planning also involves other activities, such as orthography design or revision, 
corpus planning in Kim’s prescriptions focused on coining new terms. Like the 
case of status planning above, rather than creating new terms to fill any void in 
the lexicon, Kim stressed the need to create terms to replace those which were 
already in use. In a rather bold attempt, Kim sought to erase historical traces of 
foreign influence from the language; in other words, Sino-Korean terms and 
loanwords were to be eliminated. The following is a list of criteria for replacing 
foreign and Sino-Korean words with pure Korean counterparts:1     
                                                 
1 Adapted from Kim (1966). 
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1) If a pure Korean term is synonymous with one of Sino origin, use 
the  Korean term and “cross [the latter] off from the dictionary”, 
2) use purely Korean names for places (towns, landmarks, etc.) and 
discontinue the use of their Sino-Korean names,  
3) domestic products must be renamed using only pure Korean words, 
 4) coining of new words will be done strictly in pure Korean, 
5) only legitimate words (i.e. pure Korean) can be used to name chil-
dren,  
6) new and existing words for foreign scientific concepts will be 
translated into pure Korean,  
7) military command words should be converted to pure Korean, with 
stress placed on the final syllable,  
 8) Chinese characters should not be allowed to appear in school text-
books in any form, 
9) a National Language Standardization Commission will be estab-
lished to oversee this transition. 
 
At the time of these prescriptions, the only dictionary in print in North Korea 
was the 1962 Choseonmal Sachen ‘The Korean Dictionary.’ This of course was 
published before the LPLP prescriptions and it did not conform to the new 
mandates of munhwao. It was during the first talk with the linguists when Kim, 
referring to the 1962 dictionary, proclaimed: “this Korean dictionary looks like a 
Chinese-Korean dictionary (Kim 1964).” Thus, the new policies gave rise to the 
need for an ideologically fit dictionary. Kim then ordered the compilation of a 
10,000 word dictionary free of foreign terms. Amazingly, the first edition of 
Hyontae Choseonmal Sachen, The Modern Korean Dictionary, was published in 
1968. A second edition was released in 1973 titled Choseon Munhwao Sachen, 
Cultured Korean Dictionary, and a third edition appeared in 1981.  
These guidelines for corpus planning represent a drastic attempt to purify the 
language. Yet, to rid an entire language of loanwords is a quixotic goal at best. As 
expected, even the most current version of the North’s Korean – English diction-
ary contains loanwords from Russian and English, as well as Sino-Korean terms 
(Unknown 2002). Still, when compared to a South Korean dictionary the differ-
ence in the amount of loanwords and pure Korean words is noticeable (Lee 1990). 
This in part was accomplished through Acquisition planning and North Korea’s 
peculiar publishing system. 
 
3.3  Acquisition Planning 
 
Furthermore, everyone should acquire the spirit of using our language correctly through 
ideological mobilization and a mass campaign. (Kim Il-sung 1966)   
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The goal of acquisition planning is a simple one: increase the number of users of a 
language. In order to do so, users must be provided with an opportunity to learn 
the language, for example through lessons and materials. At the same time, they 
must be provided with an incentive to learn, be it self-motivation or compulsory.  
As for materials, the mandates above required that all literary work, including 
textbooks, be rewritten. Future authors too would have to abide by the prescrip-
tions above. This sounds like quite an undertaking, but there is an important 
concept pertaining to publication in North Korea worth mentioning here. All 
authors, publishers, and publishing houses are held accountable to the Korean 
Workers’ Party (KWP), which is the organization in charge of propaganda. The 
main publisher in North Korea, Pyongyang Publishing House answers directly to 
the KWP; in fact, the Pyongyang Publish House is housed within a smaller branch 
of the KWP. Should the KWP decide which words are acceptable for print, the 
publishers have no choice but to agree. It may seem that texts published before 
these prescriptions would be problematic, but this was not an issue. In order to 
promote the legitimacy of the new regime, the KWP found it advantageous to 
destroy or at least rework all literature and publications written before Kim Il-
sung’s rise to power. Kim himself mentions the need to revise previous literary 
works in order to make them more compatible with modern times (Kim 1966). 
That said, the ability of the party to require authors to follow Kim’s prescriptions 
undoubtedly expedited the transition of acquiring the new munhwao ‘cultured 
language’ standard. 
The motivation to acquire the new munhwao ‘cultured language’ standard was 
compulsory, and like most other social campaigns, the one for acquisition plan-
ning began with the children. Kim estimated some 5,000 to 6,000 words are 
necessary for daily use and are common in primary education. He placed an 
emphasis on training teachers and revising elementary materials first in hopes that 
children would learn to correct their parents’ speech. He also suggests sending 
copies of the revised elementary textbooks to universities for their use as a 
standard. Finally, if these prescriptions were not enough to convince the popula-
tion to switch to the ideologically fit munhwao, Kim recommends “If in the future 
the people should continue to use any of the words eliminated from the dictionary, 
we could then rehabilitate them (Kim 1966).” 
 
4 Success of Language Policies in DPRK  
 
It is an enormous task to convince an entire nation to stop using or replace every-
day speech and vocabulary with the new ideologically correct munhwao standard. 
Yet Kim estimated it could be completed in a few years. Although the politically 
sensitive munhwao standard requires constant revision, Kim’s prescriptions for 
easing the transition from one dialect to another were quite effective.  
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Although the North has a tendency to boast achieving a one hundred percent 
rate for anything positive (voter turnout, production rates, etc.), there is reason to 
believe that the alleged one hundred percent rate for literacy rate holds some truth. 
Regardless of the quality, education is mandatory in North Korea and all citizens 
must read and learn to recite literary works of the Kims. Even after education is 
completed, further study and recitation of Kim Il-sung’s work is required in the 
military, factories, and elsewhere. This is responsible for the high literacy rate in 
the North. Even the CIA World Factbook (2005) goes as far as to list the literacy 
rate at ninety-nine percent. Kim’s works are all edited to conform to the prescrip-
tions described in the previous sections, and most example sentences in learners’ 
books and dictionaries are quotes from his works. This constant exposure to the 
new munhwao ‘cultured language’ likely expedited its dissemination.  
In fact, the most striking evidence for the success of these policies is the dia-
lectal differences between North and South Koreans. There was no communica-
tion between the two nations from the end of the Korean War until the first ever 
Pan-Korea summit held in 1972, nearly two decades after the war. During these 
talks, South Koreans were not shocked by what their Northern brethren had to say, 
but how they said it (Lee 1990). The language in the North evolved to the extent 
that there were intelligibility problems. This is the type of evolution that would 
normally take generations, yet in happened in the North in as little as six years 
after Kim’s prescriptions. The divergence in language continues today. Defectors 
from North Korea have repeatedly stated in interviews that one of the most 
difficult things to adjust to in life in the South is the difference in language. They 
mainly have problems with loanwords, not just those from English or German, but 
also those from Japanese as well as Sino-Korean words and their usage (Martin 
2004). 
 
5  LPLP and Social Control   
 
Unlike other LPLP case studies, the practice in North Korea has a unique role in 
society in that the policies are guided by ideology, and then in turn used to 
reinforce said ideology. This bilateral relationship makes it difficult to determine 
the boundaries between the ideology, the policies, and propaganda. For example, 
the establishment of munhwao ‘cultured language’ based on the Pyongyang 
dialect and encouraging the population to adapt the new code are typical of how 
the North Korean government approaches any social issue—they are Pyongyang-
centric and implemented through mass campaigns. Moreover, the emphasis on 
corpus planning is interesting in how it blurs the boundary between language 
policies and social control; here Juche calls for an ideologically fit language, 
munhwao, but the language is also used in tandem to support the concept of Juche.  
For example, one of Kim’s guidelines for vocabulary maintenance is that all 
North Korean products be renamed in pure Korean. His reasoning for this particu-
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lar prescription is interesting. He justifies this decision with the following quote: 
“[I]f we should leave even these Japanese names as they are how could we 
explain our prosperity (Kim 1966).” The opposite is just as true. By renaming all 
foreign products in pure Korean, there is no need to explain the prosperity of 
other nations, or the regime can attempt to ignore the presentence of foreign 
goods under the guise of using pure Korean terms for them. (Take, for instance, 
the terms for ‘ice cream’ oreum bo sugi and ‘computer’ cheoncha gesangi in the 
North, while in the South English-based loanwords are used.)  
Some of the best examples of propaganda come from the dictionaries. For ex-
ample Kumatani (1990) notes a usage tag for entries that refer to notions which 
conflict with Juche and self-reliance. He states that words for concepts such as 
kanggan ‘rape’, appak ‘oppression’, kangto ‘burglar’, pinyak ‘poverty’ and, even 
chongshinpyong ‘incurable disease’ are tagged with a usage marker narkun sahoi 
eso, meaning ‘in the old society… .’ Most dictionaries contain example sentence 
illustrating a word’s use and context. Unsurprisingly, the example sentences 
found in The Standard Korean Dictionary are all quotes from Kim Il-sung’s 
speeches (Sae 1994). Finally, the term oangjo ‘dynasty’ had to be discarded after 
the son of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, replaced his father as the leader of the 
country (Harrold 2004).  
The content of the dictionary exemplifies the role of language planning in 
propaganda and social control. The idea to create a pure Korean dictionary falls 
under corpus planning. This decision was influenced by Juche, and like the 
ideology states, the dictionary should not contain foreign words. However delib-
erately skewing definitions and excluding ideologically unfit terms is using 
corpus as a tool for social control. This demonstrates how LPLP has an interesting 
role in North Korea in that its policies are guided by Juche, yet the policies are 




In linguistics too, Juche should be established so that our language develops systematical-
ly and that our people feel national pride and self-respect in speaking and writing it. (Kim 
1966) 
 
This is not intended to be an exhaustive list or time line of LPLP in North Korea. 
However, I hope it is enough to illustrate how the notion of Juche has shaped 
language planning and policies in the North. The three components to establishing 
linguistic Juche involve the creation of munhwao ‘cultured language’ (status 
planning), overhaul of the lexicon to eliminate foreign influence (corpus plan-
ning), and lastly dictating people follow the new policy (acquisition planning). 
These actions mirror the ideology of Juche in that they seek to promote superiori-
ty through homogeneity and self-reliance. This case study is significant in that 
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language policy in North Korea is possibly the best example of a rigorous, top-
down policy widely adopted by the speech community. By focusing on an ex-
treme example of how political agenda shapes language policy, it is my hope that 
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